Chapter Seven
The Kentucky Campaign: Richmond
Out
of the 39,598 Confederates who began the Battle of Shiloh 1,728 had been killed
and 8,012 had been wounded. Federal losses were slightly higher: the combined
armies of Grant and Buell totaled 62,682, out of which 1,754 had been killed
and 8,408 had been wounded. Tennessee was lost
and Corinth was
likely to fall. During the second day of Shiloh, the Federals had taken Island
Number 10 on the Mississippi River. This opened
the Federals advance further, as became
apparent when New Orleans
fell on the April 25.
The retreat to Corinth was awful. The mules pulling the
wagons of the wounded became stuck in mud and water so deep that it came to
their bellies. The cold rain turned into a blinding storm of sleet and hail.
Some 300 died along the road that night; their bodies being thrown out of the
wagons to make room for the wounded who sought medical attention.
One of the wounded from the battle was Hindman,
who commanded the two brigades to the right of Cleburne. He was almost killed in an assault
upon the Hornet’s Nest when a large shell crashed straight into his horse,
shredding its forequarters into pieces and throwing him ten feet into the air. His
staff officers were sure that he had been blown to pieces when, from the
tangled remains of his horse, Hindman struggled to his feet, yelling:
“Tennesseans, take that battery”, then he fell to the ground and was taken off
the field. (1)
As the mangled
Army of the Mississippi arrived in Corinth, Cleburne
began to gather the remnants of his brigade. So high were the losses in his
original unit, the 15th Arkansas,
that it was eventually consolidated with the 13th Arkansas. Lt. Lucius Polk of the Yell Rifles
became its commander, replacing the fallen A. K. Patton.
The brief incidence of sharpshooting at the
Hornet’s Nest had given Cleburne
an idea. In this type of engagement, where the enemy was
well-fortified and supported by cannon, company-sized units of sharpshooters
would be very effective. The units would be used as skirmishers who could
outflank the enemy’s position or pick off artillerists from their guns. The
sharpshooters could clear areas that would impede the Confederate’s advance, or
hold back an oncoming enemy while inflicting heavy casualties at long range. Cleburne visited each of
his regimental commanders and laid the plan before them. “Gen Cleburne
in person was in our camp this morning he ordered… a detail of the best bravest
and [coolest] men (the no. of 5) from each company to form a co of sharp shooters”
wrote Lieutenant George J. Blakemore of the 23rd Tennessee, who
later became part of that elite company. (2)
Despite much drilling, “every evening” as
Robert D. Smith recalled, The Second Brigade was still very green. A
little-known fight called the Shelton House affair displayed this fact. As
Halleck began a slow pursuit from Pittsburg Landing, Cleburne and four of his regiments engaged in
skirmishes aimed at slowing their advance. Part of a Federal division, which
had been shelled out of the Shelton House by General Van Dorn, had fortified
itself to the right of the house in a wooded ravine. Cleburne sent forward his sharpshooters and
skirmished with the pickets, driving them back. Soon they were fired upon by
the enemy around the house and fell back to the battle lines. In the following
confusing events, the 5th Tennessee,
commanded by Colonel Hill, without orders rushed forward, initially pushing the
enemy back and capturing a cannon. They eventually fell back, unaided as they
were and surrounded by destructive fire. In the fight, Colonel Hill fell,
wounded by a shell. Cleburne, who had ordered another of his
regiments forward, which he knew would outflank the enemies’ position, awaited
with “painful anxiety to hear his musketry open to my right”. Unfortunately, it
never came. Galloping back to the rear, Cleburne
found the commander of the 24th Tennessee, “lying down in the rear of a
creek”. Cleburne
“unbraided” the colonel and ordered him forward. Robert D. Smith, whose
regiment was not engaged in the fight recorded, “rumor says that Hill’s 5th
Tenn. Regt. was badly cut up…Col.
Hill made a bad charge and lost a large number of his regt”. (3)
In
order that not another “Shelton
House” episode occur, Cleburne
instituted a unique method of military instruction. Colonels
from each regiment would select one line officer from their commands. These
officers would attend regular meetings in Cleburne’s
headquarters. Here, members of Cleburne’s
staff would instruct the group in infantry tactics. These officers would
instruct the other officers in their regiments, who in turn would instruct the
men.
The
Confederate’s morale was rising, despite the fact that the water supply was not
sufficient and provisions were scarce. The army’s numbers had increased to
80,000 with the arrival of Generals Van Dorn and Price; however, the number of
effectives were only 53,000 due to rampant sickness. Federal Generals Halleck
and Pope began a slow advance towards Corinth
on April 29. Fortunately, this advance was so cautious that the Confederates
had sufficient time to regroup.
On
May 3, Hardee sent Cleburne
to engage the advancing enemy, not bringing “on a fight but to feel the enemy
and to fall back.” Cleburne’s
Brigade moved forward early that afternoon on the Hamburg Road. Marching through the town
of Farmington, Cleburne placed his brigade east of Seven
Mile Creek. When the enemy appeared, a short fire was exchanged and Cleburne fell back to a
new position. After destroying the bridge and felling timbers across the road,
the enemy’s advance was delayed for two hours. When the Federals were able to
continue their advance, another short fight commenced in which Cleburne deployed his sharpshooters and
artillery, falling back late that afternoon. (4)
That
next day, Cleburne’s
Brigade was relieved of picket duty, and they withdrew from the Confederate
line of works but remained within supporting distance. The next day, Cleburne sent a letter to
General Hardee from the Farmington Road.
If the earth works here are of any importance, I must say I think they
are being neglected. No Engineer to be found, my men were ordered in advance to
protect workmen but there are no workmen to protect, everything seems out of
joint, I think Some of the Genls ought to come out and see how these works are
being done, had we been attacked up to this time I think the work done of no
value. My Aid and escort occupied (at daylight this morning) the Houses
occupied by the enemies pickets at sunset yesterday the enemy seem to have their out posts at
Farmington and to be encamped ¼ mile back of that place. I sent Philips out
with Telescope to get fuller intelligence A Negro near their lines told us that
they were as thick as bees behind Farmington We can hear their Drums very
plain. (5)
On
May 24, Halleck began to erect a fortified line of works near Corinth and mounted heavy guns for a siege.
Hardee wrote to General Beauregard on the 25:
Under these
circumstances I think the evacuation, if it be determined upon, should be made
before the enemy opens fire, and not coupled with a sortie against his [entrenchments]
or partial battle. It should be done promptly, if done at all. Even now the
enemy can shell our camp. It should be done in good order, so as not to
discourage our friends or give a pretext for the triumph of our enemies.
With the forces at
our disposition, with a vast territory behind us, with a patriotic and devoted
people to support us, the enemy, as he moved southward, away from rivers and
railroads, would find insurmountable obstacles in moving columns so heavy that
we cannot strike them, and over a country where his mechanical superiority will
not avail him.
If we resolve to
evacuate, every hour of delay only serves to augment our difficulties. The
enemy every day grows stronger on our flanks, and menaces more and more our
communications. If he effects his designs, we must fight at every disadvantage
or retreat disastrously. History and our country will judge us not by the movement,
but its consequences.
Beauregard
wrote back the following day:
I fully concur in
the views contained in your letter of the 25th instant, received last night,
and I had already commenced giving orders to my chiefs of staff departments for
its execution. But everything that is done must be done under the plea of the
intention to take the offensive at the opportune moment. Every commandant of
corps must get everything ready to move at a moment's notice, and must see to
the proper condition of the roads and bridges his corps is to travel upon.
At
night, on May 29, Beauregard successfully withdrew his army without detection
from the Federals. “Several of the brigade and regimental bands were left
behind to play tunes-somewhat nervously, perhaps-before they also departed. It
was a well-conducted operation, and Beauregard quite literally stole a march on
the enemy.” The next morning, Halleck found that Corinth had been evacuated. (6)
From a week’s rest at Baldwin,
the army moved on to Tupelo.
It was now June and the army was out of any immediate danger for the time
being. The weather was warn and dry and the army’s morale improved. Unlike Corinth, Tupelo
possessed a plentiful amount of water. With the construction of bake ovens, the
men got a luxury: bread.
During these dull days of hard
drilling, Beauregard wrote President Davis on June 14, requesting a leave for
the sake of his health. Three days later, without receiving a response,
Beauregard left for Bladen Springs and gave Bragg temporary command. Surgeons
Brodie and Choppin recommended this trip, writing: “in our professional
opinion, he is incapacitated physically for the arduous duties of his present
command, and we urgently recommend rest and recreation”. Davis claimed that Beauregard had sent no
letter asking permission to leave. Therefore, Davis grasped the opportunity to appoint a
favorite of his, Braxton Bragg, to the permanent command of the army. (7)
Bragg was a veteran of the
Mexican War. He had gained fame during the Battle of Buena Vista where he had
commanded an artillery battery. During this time, he had earned the reputation
of being “the most cantankerous man in
the army”. Now 45 years old, he was described as having a “sickly, cadaverous,
haggard appearance”. Bragg had a pessimistic view of life and it was not long
before he was at odds with his subordinates. Sam Watkins of the 1st
Tennessee Regiment recalled that none “of General Bragg’s soldiers ever loved
him They had no faith in his ability as a general. He was looked upon as a
merciless tyrant.” The name of Bragg “had more terror than the advancing hosts
of Halleck’s army”. Cleburne
had reason to doubt Bragg’s leadership qualities from the start. He remembered
Bragg’s ill-fated order to charge the enemy through flanking fire on the second
day of Shiloh. (8)
It was now late July and the
heart of campaigning season; but still the army remained at Tupelo. Major General Edmund Kirby Smith,
commander of the 9,000 man department of east Tennessee,
wrote both Davis and Bragg letters suggesting a joint invasion into Tennessee and possibly Kentucky. Smith was being pressed in East
Tennessee by a corps from Buell’s army at Corinth.
Unless they were immediately checked, the main line between the East and West
would be severed.
On July 21, Bragg wired Davis
to inform him of the movement from Tupelo to Chattanooga. Cleburne’s Brigade left for Chattanooga on July 26. Riding on rail
through Mississippi to Mobile,
the brigade left the train and marched to the Pearl River
docks. Going across in steamers, they continued their journey via train to Montgomery. Changing
trains, they traveled to Atlanta, and finally to
Chattanooga.
In his report to Richmond, Bragg wrote:
Maj. Gen. E. Kirby
Smith, commanding the Department of East Tennessee, met me by invitation in Chattanooga, and most
generously placed his whole command at my disposal. It was soon determined,
upon his suggestion, that all his force should be used to operate upon the
enemy's left at Cumberland Gap, and he was requested to confer with Brigadier
Gen. Humphrey Marshall, commanding in Southwestern
Virginia, with whom he was already in correspondence, to secure
his co-operation also in the movement. After returning to Knoxville General
Smith asked for further assistance, and two fine brigades, under Brigadier Gen.
P. R. Cleburne and Col. Preston Smith, were sent to him in addition to the
division which had gone from Tupelo.
On
August 5, Cleburne
received his orders:
Cleburne's brigade,
Third Division, and [Preston] Smith's brigade, First Division, Army of the
Mississippi, without artillery, will proceed by rail to Knoxville, Tenn., with
all possible dispatch, and report to Major General E. Kirby Smith for temporary
service. these brigades will move with two days' cooked rations and 100 rounds
of ammunition to each man and in light marching order, prepared to take the
field and meet the enemy at once. The chief quartermaster will give all possible
celerity to the movement.
The
next day, Cleburne’s Brigade traveled to Knoxville to meet up with
Gen. Smith. The new temporary additions increased Smith’s army to 20,000.
Preston Smith and Cleburne’s
brigades were lumped together for this campaign to create a small division.
Kirby Smith named Cleburne
as acting division commander. (9)
By now, the Confederate generals strongly
considered the possibility of marching into Kentucky rather than Middle Tennessee. If
they were to do this, Kirby Smith should bypass the Federals at Cumberland Gap
and proceed to Lexington.
Meanwhile, Confederate Colonel John Hunt Morgan had led his Kentuckians on a
raid north of Nashville
where they destroyed two railroad tunnels. The destruction of these tunnels
shut down Buell’s supply line for 98 days.
Marching all day and into the night,
Smith’s army advanced across hardly passable roads. At one point, “the ascent
was so steep the horses could not pull the artillery up the slope, and the men
had to take hold of long ropes and manhandle the guns over the high spots”.
Finally, after seven days of hard traveling, Smith’s army had successively
marched around the Federals at Cumberland Gap
and had forced them to fall back. (10)
On August 27, General Smith ordered Cleburne’s Division to
advance to support Colonel Scott’s Cavalry. Smith had sent Scott forward to
reconnoiter the enemy. Scott reported that he had overtaken a Federal supply
train of 130 loaded wagons and Smith ordered him to hold his position until Cleburne came. By the
afternoon of the 28, Cleburne
had found the enemy’s pickets and ordered a halt.
Cleburne wrote:
On the morning of
the 29th ultimo I was ordered by you to advance on the Richmond road to a point where the road
emerged from a gap in the hills about 5 miles from the foot of Big Hill, and to
act as advance guard of the army. About 5 p.m. I heard cannonading in my front,
and learned that Colonel Scott's cavalry were being driven in and they had
already lost one of the mountain howitzers. Subsequently the cannonading
ceased, and Colonel Scott, coming into camp, informed me he was encamped in the
road in my front; that our whole front was well picketed; that the enemy were
not advancing.
Cleburne faced his men
towards the enemy in battle lines. “This was not accomplished until some time
after dark. I then warned commanders of regiments at the first alarm to bring
their regiments to their prescribed positions on this line, and then dismissed
them, retaining, however, my battery and company of sharpshooters on the line.”
(11)
Cleburne had hardly done
this, when loud yells and firing were heard. “Almost simultaneously a multitude
of stragglers, consisting of part of Colonel Scott's cavalry brigade, sick men,
baggage wagons, servants leading horses, came flying in the utmost
consternation, closely pursued by the whole of Colonel Metcalfe's command of United States
cavalry, who were firing on them and yelling as though they were all excited
with liquor.” (12)
Cleburne reformed his line
and sent his brigade, commanded by Ben Hill, up 50 yards in battle line “upon a
range of small hills which commanded the pike and fields on both sides for more
than half a mile”. The battery under Captain Douglas was placed on a hill and
was supported by sharpshooters. A regiment of Federal cavalry came thundering
down the road with their commander, Metcalf yelling “Charge and shoot down the
rebels”. The sharpshooters took aim and fired “throwing the cavalry into utter
confusion, causing a pell-mell retreat”. Colonel Hill recollected seeing “the
place strewn with blankets and accouterments”. (13)
The Federals dismounted and again advanced.
Cleburne wrote,
“It was very dark and they could not see my line of battle, but they kept up a
continuous fire on our camp-fires, which were blazing brightly 300 yards in our
rear. A few sharpshooters were now pushed forward, the enemy showing great
reluctance to advance, and in spite of curses and threats, which we could
plainly hear, the whole force of the enemy precipitately retreated.” (14)
“In this affair we had but one man wounded.
The enemy had several dangerously wounded. We captured 30 prisoners, 100 stand
of arms, and several horses. The enemy retreated in such haste they cut the
reins of their horses, which, as before stated, they had hitched for the
purpose of advancing on foot, fearing it would take too much time to unhitch
them. My men slept in line of battle without any supper, and at daylight again
advanced in search of the enemy.” While his men slept, a staff officer from
General Smith arrived to inform Cleburne
that he was to attack that next morning. (15)
At 4 am, August 30 Cleburne moved his division and two batteries
forward. Cleburne
sent a company of Scott’s Cavalry to find the enemy. “The cavalry scouts here
reported the position of the enemy in large force three-quarters of a mile
north of the little village
of Kingston.” After
receiving this report, Cleburne
himself went forward to scout the enemy. “Going forward to reconnoiter I could
distinctly see their first line facing us at right angles to the Richmond road,
with one regiment to the right of the road, the others in the timber to the
left. They had a battery masked near the Richmond
road.” (16)
Cleburne placed the Second
Brigade ( Ben Hill commanding) in a battle line behind a hill which ran about
500 yards parallel to the enemy’s line. Cleburne
placed the First Brigade (Preston Smith commanding) behind another hill in the
Second Brigade’s rear but within supporting distance. Cleburne wrote “While making these
dispositions the enemy, showing only one regiment, kept up a ridiculous fire on
us from a little mountain howitzer which they had captured the day before from
Colonel Scott.” Robert D. Smith, who temporarily was in command of the
division’s ordinance wagons wrote:
I had some
difficulty in controlling my teamsters, as the enemy got the range of my team
with their artillery and shelled it most furiously for some time, several of my
men made narrow escapes. I proceeded in supplying my division with ammunition
without getting anyone hurt. (17)
Cleburne soon answered
with his artillery. Placing Douglas’ battery on a hill near his center, Cleburne ordered it to open fire on a squad of cavalry in
the Richmond
road. “In a moment this squad disappeared, unmasking a battery, which opened a
rapid fire.” (18)
Cleburne ordered Colonel
Hill to detail a company of sharpshooters from the Second Tennessee to the left
of the Richmond Pike to pick off “horses and gunners from the enemy's battery”.
Likewise, he sent skirmishers from the 15th Arkansas
to occupy some woods to the right of the line. (19)
Finding that the sharpshooters and Douglas’
Battery were holding the Federals in check, Cleburne ordered acting Brigadier General
Preston Smith to move his battery forward to the right of the Hill’s Brigade
and open fire. About this time, Cleburne
received orders from General Kirby Smith to avoid a general battle until
General Churchill’s Division could arrive. Therefore, Cleburne ordered the “artillery to fire very
slowly and not waste a round”. (20)
Meanwhile, Federal Brigadier General Mahlon
Dikerson Manson was frustrated by Cleburne’s
tactics; many of his artillerymen had been picked off by the Confederate
sharpshooters. After opening the battle with his four regiments and two pieces
of artillery placed advantageously in woods and behind a fence, a skirmish
ensued in which his brigade fought “in the most gallant style”, as he
said. Despite these tactical advantages and strict orders “not to fight the
enemy” from his superior, Major General William “Bull” Nelson, Manson ordered a move to turn
their right flank. (21)
When Cleburne
saw that the enemy was advancing towards his right flank, he sent 154th
Tennessee Regiment from Preston Smith’s Brigade to the right of Hill’s Brigade
to extend his line. The enemy soon had pushed the skirmishers back and were
engaging the 154th .
“A close fire soon commenced on the right,
and became so heavy I found it necessary to sustain the right with a further
re-enforcement. I detached Colonel [L. E.] Polk, commanding the Thirteenth and
Fifteenth Arkansas Regiments, to the support of the One hundred and
fifty-fourth Tennessee.”
(22)
Robert M. Frierson, of the 48th Tennessee, heard the fight the 13th/ 15th
Arkansas and 154th Tennessee were having with the enemy and wondered why Cleburne had not ordered
his regiment over to help. Cleburne, realizing
that the enemy had staked everything in turning his flank, ordered Preston
Smith’s three regiments to the far right of the action so as to overlap the
enemy’s line and flank him. Frierson recorded, ”our grand commander's
strategy showed itself. A wild, tumultuous yell, a crash of musketry, and
Preston Smith's Brigade had taken them in flank.” Preston Smith wrote that he placed his
“regiments entirely in the rear of the enemy, from which position my brigade
advanced on him, taking him by surprise, and after a few well-directed volleys
compelling him to abandon his cover and flee in great confusion toward his
reserve”. (23)
Cleburne figured that since
the enemy had committed to attacking his right flank with most of his force, his
remaining troops could be easily routed. As soon as he heard the roar of Preston
Smith’s musketry to his right and the subsequent retreat, he sent Hill’s
Brigade forward to the remaining enemy. Cleburne galloped around
to see how Smith’s Brigade was doing; he was proud to see that all was in
order; the enemy had been repulsed with a great slaughter and some 500
prisoners had been taken.
Satisfied, Cleburne put his attention to Hill’s advance.
“Before I got far, however, I was addressed by Colonel Polk, who was being
carried wounded to the rear. I stopped an instant to reply and while doing so
received a very painful wound in the mouth, which in a few minutes deprived me
of the powers of speech and rendered my further presence on the field worse
than useless. I sent aides to inform General Preston Smith of my mishap and to
direct him to take command of the division; also to inform Colonel Hill and
yourself of the situation of affairs.” The bullet had entered Cleburne’s left cheek, smashed into two
teeth, and exited his open mouth. Later, Cleburne
would joke about the incident, saying that he “caught the ball in his mouth and
spat it out.” (24)
Before he retired from the field, he saw
the results of the charge, what one veteran claimed was “the most gallant
charge” of Cleburne’s
men. Frierson remembered:
Just as we reached
the pike a full volley of canister from one of the enemy's batteries went above
our heads, sounding like an immense covey of birds on wing. Our skirmishers'
well aimed rifles on their cannoneers were effective, and their rout was
soon complete. For four miles we gave chase, skirmishing with their rear guard
until we reached Zion
Church. There they formed
for fight, but a determined rush by the old Forty eighth, supported on the left
by the Second and on the right by the Thirty fifth, caused them to leave their
position precipitately, and then again we took up the chase. On the outskirts
of the town, through the cemetery, a contiguous cornfield and a grove of walnut
trees, Bull Nelson, who had arrived with his division and what remained of
Manson's and Krauft's commands, deployed to receive us, We quickly formed our lines
and moved on the cemetery.
Ben
Hill’s brigade shattered the Federal center sending “their scattered forces
extended from the right of the road through the corn fields on the left for
half a mile”. Soon the Federal’s right flank broke with a charge from the
finally-arrived Churchill’s Division. (25)
The Federals reformed between Gibbs Meadow
and Richmond.
But these only made a brief stand before being scattered. During the final
stand, the overall Federal commander of Kentucky,
General William Nelson arrived from Lexington to take command
of the fleeing troops from General Manson. The final fight ended with Nelson
wounded and Manson captured. Cleburne, when he
could talk, said that: “His army was
broken up, and “Bull” Nelson sent howling back to Louisville with a bullet through his leg.”
(26)
The victory was complete. By the end of the
day 5,000 Confederates had whipped 10,000 Federals inflicting over 1,000
casualties, capturing 5,000 prisoners, and picking up 9 pieces of artillery and
10,000 small arms. Nelson was not happy with Manson. In a report to
headquarters, Nelson wrote, “What the motive of General Manson was in bringing
on an action under the circumstances, and marching 5 miles to do so, I will
leave him to explain to you”. (27)
Kirby Smith summed up:
As regards the
intrepid behavior of the true patriots (the men in ranks) I can only say that
as long as the destinies of the South remain in such hands we need never fear
Northern subjugation. But even more than their noble courage before the enemy
are we called upon to admire that higher courage which enabled them to undergo
without murmur the fatigue and privations of one of the most difficult marches
of this war. For several days and parts of the nights, through a country almost
entirely without water, over stony roads, with their almost bare feet, and with
green corn and beef without salt as their only food, did these gallant men
trudge along, inspired only with the desire of being led against the invaders
of their homes and the oppressors of their liberties. (28)
Sources
1: The
Lion of the South: chapter 5 page 108
2: Pat
Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 6 page 72
3: Robert D. Smith:
page 28
: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 6 page 76
: Ibid
: Ibid
: Robert D. Smith:
page 31
4: Pat
Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 6 page 73
5:
Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 6 page 73
6: Hardee to Beauregard: O.R Series I VOL X, PT II pgs 545-546
: Beauregard to Hardee: O.R Series I VOL X, PT
II pg 547
: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 5 page 84
7: The
Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government Vol. II by Jefferson Davis: page 60
8:
Stonewall of the West: Chapter 5 page 85
: Ibid
: Co. Aytch A Confederate Memoir of the Civil
war by Sam R. Watkins: Chapter 3 page 33
: Ibid
9: Bragg’s
Report of the Kentucky Campaign: O. R. Series I Volume 16 part I pages
1088-1094
: Chattanooga, Tenn.
August 5, 1862: O. R. Series I Vol. 16 Part 2 pages 744-745
10: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 5 page 87-88
11: Cleburne’s
report of the Battle of Richmond, Ky: O.R . Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages
944-946
: Ibid
12: O.R. Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages 944-946
13: Report of Colonel Benjamin J. Hill: O.R Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages
949-952
: O.R. Series I Vol. 16 Part
1 pages 944-946
: O.R Series I Vol. 16 Part
1 pages 949-952
: Ibid
14: O.R . Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages 944-946
15: O.R . Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages 944-946
16: O.R Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages 949-952
: O.R .
Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages 944-946
17: O.R . Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages 944-946
: Robert D. Smith:
page 59
18: O.R . Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages 944-946
19: O.R Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages 949-952
20: O.R . Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages 944-946
21: Report of Brigadier General Mahlon D.
Manson: O.R. Series I Vol. 16 part 1 pages 910-916
: Report of Major General William Nelson: O.R.
Series I Vol. 16 part 1 pages 908-910
22:
O.R . Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages 944-946
23: GEN. E. KIRBY SMITH'S CAMPAIGN IN
KENTUCKY by Robert M. Frierson: CV 1893 pg 11
: Report of Colonel Preston
Smith: O.R I Vol. 16 Part 1 pg 946-949
24: O.R . Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pages 944-946
: Stonewall of the West:
Chapter 5 page 91
25: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 5 page 91
: Robert M. Frierson:
CV 1893 pg 11
: O.R Series I Vol. 16 Part
1 pages 949-952
26: Pat
Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 7 page 82
27: O.R. Series I Vol. 16 part 1 pages 908-910
28: Report of Kirby Smith O.R. Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pg 933-935